

# The political economy of AI: Who controls the means of prediction?

Maximilian Kasy

Department of Economics, University of Oxford

20 February, 2023

AI and its social impact in the news

**Why it's so damn hard to make AI  
fair and unbiased**

**Why artificial intelligence design  
must prioritize data privacy**

**What Does It Mean to Align AI With  
Human Values?**

**How to Build  
Accountability into Your AI**

**Why 'the future of AI is the future of work'**

# Steps toward regulating AI

- European Union:

● Council of the EU Press release 6 December 2022 10:20

## **Artificial Intelligence Act: Council calls for promoting safe AI that respects fundamental rights**

- United States:

### **BLUEPRINT FOR AN AI BILL OF RIGHTS**

**MAKING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS WORK FOR  
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE**

# Introduction

- Concerns about the impact of AI:
  - Fairness, discrimination, and inequality.
  - Privacy, data property rights, and data governance.
  - Value alignment and the impending robot apocalypse.
  - Explainability and accountability.
  - Automation and wage inequality.
- Efforts to regulate AI.
- How can we think systematically about these questions?

*Kasy, M. (2023). The political economy of AI:  
Towards democratic control of the means of prediction.*

# Key takeaways of this talk

1. AI systems maximize a single, measurable **objective**.
2. In society, different individuals have **different objectives**.  
AI systems generate winners and losers.
3. Society-level assessments of AI  
require trading off individual gains and losses.
4. AI requires democratic control  
of algorithms, data, and computational infrastructure,  
to align **algorithm objectives** and **social welfare**.

# How is this economics?

- Economics shares with AI and machine learning (ML) the languages of
  - optimization, and
  - probability.
- Economics, unlike AI and ML, considers
  - multiple agents
  - with unequal endowments,
  - conflicting interests, and
  - private information.
- Natural frameworks to think about the impact of AI:
  - Welfare economics,
  - social choice theory, and
  - causal inference.

# Examples

- Algorithms for social networks / search engines select content to maximize user engagement, and ultimately **ad revenue**.
  - What about the impact on the public sphere and **democracy**?
  - What about (teenage) **mental health**?
- Algorithms for sales platforms set prices to maximize **monopoly profits**.
  - What about **consumer welfare**?
- Algorithms for hiring select job candidates who will contribute to **profits**; and who will **not join a union**.
  - What about equity, **social mobility**?
  - What about **worker voice**?

# Roadmap

1. Background 1:
  - What is AI?
2. Background 2:
  - How do we measure social welfare?
  - Who could be agents of change?
3. The ethics, social impact, and regulation of AI:
  - Fairness, discrimination, and inequality.
  - Privacy, data property rights, and data governance.
  - Value alignment and the impending robot apocalypse.
  - Explainability and accountability.
  - Automation and wage inequality.



What is AI?

Social welfare and agents of change

The ethics and social impact of AI

# AI is automated decisionmaking

- AI systems maximize measurable **objectives**:

Russell and Norvig (2016), chapter 2:

*For each possible percept sequence, a rational agent should select an action that is expected to maximize its performance measure, given the evidence provided by the percept sequence and whatever built-in knowledge the agent has.*

- Leading approach: Machine learning (ML).  
Based on statistical inference.
- Other paradigms exist:  
Expert systems, automated reasoning.

# Supervised learning

- Predicting outcomes  $Y$  given features  $X$ .
- Prediction  $g(X)$ , prediction loss  $l(g(X), Y)$ .
- Key ideas:  
Variance / bias tradeoff.  
Tuning using cross-validation.

## Examples:

- Image recognition, voice recognition, automatic translation.
- Evaluation of job candidates / university applicants, bail setting in courts, credit scoring.
- Predicting ad clicks, user engagement.

## Objective:

$$E[l(g(X), Y)]$$


## Chihuahua or Muffin?




# Deep learning

- One approach to supervised learning.
- Building prediction functions  $g(\cdot)$  from many simpler functions (“neurons”).
- Successful for large, rich data sets.

## A neural net



## Sloth or chocolate croissant?



# Targeted treatment assignment

- Typically, prediction is only the first step.
- Often used to assign a treatment  $W = h(X)$  based on features  $X$ .
- Maximize average outcomes  $Y$  among the treated.  
 $\Rightarrow$  Treat if  $g(X) > 0$ .

## Examples:

- Hiring job candidates.
- Giving credit.
- Admitting students.
- Choosing medical treatments.

## Objective:

$$E[h(X) \cdot Y]$$



# Multi-armed bandits

- Often we need to learn while taking actions.
- Maximize average outcomes over time.

⇒ Tradeoff between

1. *exploration*  
(experimenting to figure out what works),
2. and *exploitation*  
(using what we have learned).

## Examples:

- Use a new medical treatment?
- Show a particular ad?
- Provide a training to an unemployed worker?

## Objective:

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^T Y_i$$



# Key takeaways

- AI constructs systems which maximize a **measurable objective** (reward).
- Such systems take data as an input, and produce chosen actions as an output.

What is AI?

Social welfare and agents of change

The ethics and social impact of AI



# Social welfare

Common presumption for many theories of justice:

- Normative statements about society are based on statements about individual welfare
- Formally:
  - Individuals  $i = 1, \dots, n$ .
  - Individual  $i$ 's welfare  $v_i$ .
  - **Social welfare** is a function of individuals' welfare

$$F(v_1, \dots, v_n).$$

# Many questions

- **Who is to be included** among  $i = 1, \dots, n$ ?
  - All citizens? All residents? All humans on earth?
  - Future generations? Animals?
- **How to measure individual welfare**  $v_i$ ?
  - Opportunities or outcomes?
  - Utility? Resources? Capabilities?
- **How to aggregate** to **social welfare**? How much do we care about
  - Millionaires vs. homeless people?
  - Sick vs. healthy people?
  - Groups that were victims of historic injustice?

# How to measure individual welfare

## Utilitarian approach:

- Dominant in economics
- Formally:
  - Choice set  $C_i$ .
  - Utility function  $u_i(x)$ , for  $x \in C_i$ .
  - Realized welfare

$$v_i = \max_{x \in C_i} u_i(x).$$

- Double role of utility
  - Positive: Individuals choose utility-maximizing  $x$ .
  - Normative: Welfare is realized utility.

# Aggregating to social welfare

Welfare weights:

- Social welfare  $F(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ .
- Define:

$$\omega_i := \frac{\partial}{\partial v_i} F(v_1, \dots, v_n).$$

- Welfare weight  $\omega_i$  measures how much we care about increasing welfare of  $i$ .
- There is no “objective” way to pick welfare weights.

# Agents of change

- How do we ensure that the objectives maximized by AI align with maximizing social welfare  $F(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ ?
- Which agents have the interests, the values, and the capacity, to move technology and policy?
- Voluntary ethical behavior by corporate managers and engineers?
- Economics: Corporations are primarily profit maximizing. Profit maximization might not be aligned with social welfare maximization.
- Democratic control is necessary. Those affected by AI decisions need to have effective control over the objectives that are maximized.

# Key takeaways

- Different individuals have different objectives.  
In terms of these objectives, AI systems generate winners and losers.
- Going from individual gains and losses to **society-level assessments** of AI requires aggregation, trading off individual gains and losses.

What is AI?

Social welfare and agents of change

The ethics and social impact of AI

# Fairness, discrimination, and inequality

## Standard view:

(Pessach and Shmueli, 2020)

- Fairness  $\approx$  treating people of the same “merit” independently of their group membership.
- If an algorithm is maximizing **firm profits** then its decisions are fair by assumption.
- No matter how unequal the resulting outcomes within and across groups.
- Only deviations from profit-maximization are “unfair.”

## Alternate view:

(Kasy and Abebe, 2021)

- **Welfare** / equality  $\approx$  (counterfactual / causal) consequences of an algorithm for the distribution of welfare of different people.
- Fairness vs. equality:
  1. Improved prediction  $\Rightarrow$  Treatments more aligned with “merit.”  
Good for fairness, bad for equality.
  2. Affirmative action / redistribution:  
Bad for fairness, good for equality.



# Privacy, data property rights, and data governance

## Standard view:

(Dwork and Roth, 2014)

- Differential privacy.
  - It should make (almost) no observable difference whether your data are in a dataset.
  - No matter what other information is available to a decisionmaker.
- Machine learning performance is unaffected by differential privacy.
- Related:  
Individual property rights over data.

## Alternate view:

(Viljoen, 2021)

- Primary use of data in ML is to learn *relationships*, not individual data.  
⇒ Informational externalities.  
(Acemoglu et al., 2022)
- Privacy / property rights cannot prevent harms from AI.  
⇒ Only democratic governance can address harms, not individual property rights.

# Value alignment and conflicts of interest

## **Standard view:** (Russell, 2019):

- Value alignment is a gap between human and **machine objectives**.
- Possible solutions:
  1. More careful engineering of objective functions.
  2. Infer objectives from observed human behavior ("inverse reinforcement learning").

## **Alternate view:**

- Value alignment is a gap between the **objectives of those controlling the algorithm** and the **rest of society**.
- Additionally:  
Not everything is observable, imposing fundamental limits on optimization.
- Possible solutions:
  1. Democratic control to align **algorithm objectives** with **society**.
  2. Refrain from deploying AI in some consequential settings.

# Explainability and accountability

## Standard view:

- Which algorithmic decisions can be “explained?” (Vredenburg, 2022)
  - “Simple” mapping from data to decisions.
  - “Simple” is a moving target.
- Related: Who is responsible for algorithmic decisions?

## Alternate view:

- We need transparency on **objectives** and constraints, not on algorithms.
  - Complicated algorithms can have simple objectives.
- ⇒ Possibility of public debate on legitimate objectives.
- ⇒ **Democratic control**, rather than plutocracy, in the choice of objectives.

# Automation and wage inequality

## Standard view:

(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011)

- Production function framework :
  - Total output is a function of inputs: Workers, capital, technology.
  - Wage = marginal productivity.
- Technical progress without shared prosperity:
  - Change in technology such that
  - output increases, but
  - marginal productivity decreases.

## Alternate view:

- AI is more than just another shifter of the production function.
  - Optimization of rewards,
  - by choosing actions
  - based on available data.
- Political economy:
  1. Who chooses the **objective** (reward function)?
  2. Who controls the data?
  3. Who controls the hardware and software to do the optimization?

# Key takeaways

- Issues raised by AI:  
Fairness, privacy, value alignment, accountability, and automation.
- Resolving them requires democratic control of
  - algorithm objectives,
  - and of the means to obtain them:  
Data and computational infrastructure.
- Democratic control requires
  - public debate and
  - binding collective decision-making,
  - at many different levels of society.

Thank you!