
The Means of Prediction How AI Really Works (And Who Benefits)

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
Fall 2025



Are you scared of AI?

A popular dystopian story:

- Al will attain superhuman capabilities,
- will start to self-improve exponentially,
- and will threaten human existence in the name of self-preservation.



2001: A Space Odyssey



Terminator



Ex Machina

- Such stories touch on our deepest fears:
 - Losing our livelihoods, autonomy, lives, and loved ones,
 - to inscrutable and inevitable forces.
- But they don't enable good decisions:
 - Make it seem like AI and its use are fate.
 - Obscure conflicts over who controls AI.
- Intentional obfuscation by tech players?

A more accurate story

- 1. All is automated decision-making using optimization.
- 2. Key issue: Who gets to pick the *objectives* that Al optimizes? (Not: Did the Al fail to optimize?)
- 3. Power flows from control of Al *inputs*: data, compute, expertise, energy.
- 4. We need *democratic control* of Al objectives by those affected by Al decisions.

Some examples

Beyond the headline-grabbing large language models:

- Algorithmic management of gig-workers.
- Automatic screening of job candidates.
- Filtering and selection of social media feeds, search engine results.
- Ad targeting.
- Predictive policing and incarceration.
- Automated choice of bombing/assassination targets (e.g. Gaza).

How Al works

The political economy of Al

Regulating algorithms

How Al works


The book explains the foundations of machine learning and Al without math:

- Al is automated decision-making, maximizing some reward.
- Machine learning is AI using statistics.
 - Supervised learning: Prediction
 - Overfitting versus underfitting, tuning.
 - Deep learning, transformers.
 - Online learning: Choosing actions over time.
 - Exploration versus exploitation.
 - Planning.

Variance/bias tradeoff

- Prediction errors are due to either
 - estimation errors (variance), or
 - approximation errors (bias).
- More data → variance goes down.
- ullet More model complexity (and thus compute) o bias goes down, variance goes up.

Tuning of supervised learning algorithms




Scaling laws and the production function of AI

- Empirical counterpart: Scaling laws of LLMs. Write
 - L for the prediction loss (e.g. negative log likelihood),
 - N for model size,
 - D for data size.
- (Hoffmann et al., 2022): For $\alpha=.34$ and $\beta=.28$.,

$$L(N,D) = \frac{A}{N^{\alpha}} + \frac{B}{D^{\beta}} + L_0,$$

Key motivation for the bet on scale of the Al industry.

Scaling of large language models



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The means of prediction

- These foundations clarify what resources are needed for AI:
 - Data
 - Compute
 - Expertise
 - Energy
- Implications:
 - Potential for future improvements (domain-dependent).
 - Control of AI by controlling its inputs.
 - Contests over property rights, externalities.

Agents of change

Who can align Al objectives with social welfare?

- Interests, values, and strategic leverage.
- Al companies? Constrained by profit maximization.
- Al discourse should address others:
 - Workers (click-, gig-, tech-), consumers,
 - media and public opinion, state and law.
- Ultimate goal:
 - Democratic control of AI objectives
 - by those impacted by AI decisions.

Ideological obfuscation

- Ideology: Represents
 - Interests of a particular group as those of society at large.
 - Contingent choices as objective necessity.
 - Social relationships as technical ones.
- Popular AI stories that prevent change:
 - 1. Man versus machine: Obfuscates conflicts within society.
 - 2. Intelligence explosion: Not human choices but autonomous process.
 - 3. Only experts understand AI: Prevents democratic control of tech companies.
 - 4. If we don't do it, China will: Political inevitability.

How Al works

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Regulating algorithms

Regulating algorithms

Ramifications of this perspective for various policy domains:

- 1. Value alignment and the limits of Al
- 2. Privacy and data ownership
- 3. Workplace automation and the labor market
- 4. Fairness and algorithmic discrimination
- 5. Explainability of algorithms and algorithmic decisions

Value alignment and the limits of Al

- Value alignment and Al safety:
 - Maximizing a slightly mis-specified objective can have bad consequences.
 - This formalizes the man versus machine stories.
- Analogous to multi-tasking (e.g. teaching to the test).
 - Reward design for AI \approx incentive design for contracts.
- More important: Democratic control to align
 - the objectives of those controlling AI,
 - with the objectives of society at large.


Privacy and data ownership

- Differential privacy:
 - (Almost) no observable difference whether your data are in a dataset.
- Individual property rights (e.g. GDPR):
 - Control over whom to share data with.
- But: Learning is all about the externalities.
 - Learning patterns, not individual observations.
 - Individual privacy / property rights cannot prevent harms from AI.
 - Need collective democratic governance of data.

Workplace automation and the labor market

- Micro-theory:
 - New technologies unambiguously increase average output, given inputs.
 - But the effect on marginal output is ambiguous.
 - It depends on technological choices.
- Automation and growth without shared prosperity:
 - Increased average output, decreased marginal output for workers.
- Who controls the development and deployment of new technology?
 - Who controls the objectives of workplace AI?
 - Co-determination and workplace democracy matter!

Growth without shared prosperity




Fairness and algorithmic discrimination

- Most definitions of algorithmic fairness:
 - Treating people of the same "merit" (productivity, risk, etc.)
 - independently of their group membership.
- Algorithmic version of Becker's definition of taste-based discrimination:
 - Can decision be justified based on monetary objectives alone?
- Both:
 - Are supposed to reflect interests of disadvantaged groups,
 - but instead measure deviations from profit maximization.
- Alternative to this optimization-error perspective:
 - What is the causal impact of algorithms on inequality
 - between and within groups.

Explainability

- 1. Explaining decision functions:
 - Simple approximations to complicated functions.
 - Motivated by incompletely specified objectives.
- 2. Explaining decisions:
 - How would inputs need to change, to change decision?
 - Motivated by individual recourse.
- 3. Explaining decision problems:
 - What is the objective, action space, data used?
 - Motivated by collective democratic control.

Counterfactual explanations of decisions



Thank you!

Book available for ordering here:

https:

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