

# Empirical research on economic inequality: Normative considerations and empirical practice.

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## Literature

Questions asked in the empirical literature on economic inequality:

- ▶ What's the share of top incomes, and how has it changed?  
Atkinson et al. (2011)
- ▶ How and why did women's participation in wage labor change over time?  
Goldin (2006)
- ▶ Is there racial discrimination in the labor market?  
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)
- ▶ Has the decline of unionization led to rising inequality?  
Fortin and Lemieux (1997)

- ▶ What's the role of migration, technical change, education in explaining wage inequality?  
Card (2009), Autor et al. (2008)
- ▶ How large is intergenerational economic mobility, and what are the factors that influence it?  
Chetty et al. (2014)
- ▶ Who benefits or loses from price changes due to trade?  
Deaton (1989)
- ▶ How should redistributive taxes be designed?  
Saez (2001)

## What to ask?

- ▶ Which of these questions should we focus on?
- ▶ What are the objects we should try to estimate?
- ▶ What methods should we use to estimate them?
- ▶ How should we report empirical findings?
- ▶ How should we evaluate findings?

## Normative questions and empirical research

- ▶ We ask empirical questions because we think the answers matter.
- ▶ Statistical reporting is necessarily selective.
- ▶ Thereby relies on implicit normative choices.
- ▶ An explicit normative framework is helpful to provide guidance on
  1. which empirical questions to ask.
  2. how to interpret the answers.

## This talk

1. Social welfare functions
2. Intergenerational mobility and inequality of opportunity
3. Between group inequality and labor market discrimination

⇒ takeaways for empirical research

## 1) Social welfare and normative individualism

Common presumption for most theories of justice:

- ▶ Normative statements about society based on statements about individual welfare
- ▶ Formally:
  - ▶ Individuals  $i = 1, \dots, n$
  - ▶ Individual  $i$ 's welfare  $v_i$
  - ▶ Social welfare as function of individuals' welfare

$$SWF = F(v_1, \dots, v_n).$$

- ▶ **Who is to be included** among  $i = 1, \dots, n$ ?
  - ▶ All citizens? All residents? All humans on earth?
  - ▶ Future generations? Animals?
- ▶ **How to measure individual welfare**  $v_i$ ?
  - ▶ Opportunities or outcomes?
  - ▶ Utility? Resources? Capabilities?
- ▶ **How to aggregate** to *SWF*?

How much do we care about

  - ▶ Trevon vs. Emily, Sophie vs. José?
  - ▶ Millionaires vs. homeless people?
  - ▶ Sick vs. healthy people?
  - ▶ Groups that were victims of historic injustice?



## How to aggregate

Welfare weights:

- ▶  $SWF = F(v_1, \dots, v_n)$
- ▶ Define:

$$\omega_i := \frac{\partial}{\partial v_i} F(v_1, \dots, v_n).$$

- ▶ For small change of some policy:

$$dSWF = \sum_i \omega_i \cdot dv_i.$$

- ▶ Welfare weight  $\omega_i$  measures how much we care about increasing welfare of  $i$ .
- ▶ There is no “objective” way to pick welfare weights.

## Takeaways for empirical research

- ▶ **Averages are meaningless**, unless you have very anti-egalitarian preferences.
- ▶ There can be reasonable disagreement about welfare weights.
  - ▶ ⇒ **Report disaggregated results.**
  - ▶ Allows readers to evaluate no matter what their welfare weights,
  - ▶ makes tradeoffs between winners and losers of changes explicit.
- ▶ For instance:
  - ▶ Quantiles and effects on quantiles.
  - ▶ Effects for demographic subgroups.

## How to measure individual welfare

### Utilitarian approach:

- ▶ Dominant in economics
- ▶ Formally:
  - ▶ Choice set  $C_i$
  - ▶ Utility function  $u_i(x)$ , for  $x \in C_i$
  - ▶ Realized welfare

$$v_i = \max_{x \in C_i} u_i(x).$$

- ▶ Double role of utility
  - ▶ Determines choices (individuals choose utility-maximizing  $x$ )
  - ▶ Normative yardstick (welfare is realized utility)

- ▶ Policies do not change  $u_i$  but change  $C_i$   
⇒ change  $v_i$
- ▶ Problems with utilitarian approach:
  1. Preferences do not exist in a pre-social vacuum.  
(parental aspirations, gender norms, ...)
  2. People might not always act according to their preferences.  
(cf. behavioral economics)
  3. How to compare utility across people?

## Alternative to utilitarianism 1 – Capabilities approach:

- ▶ Proposed by
  - Sen, A. (1995). Inequality reexamined. Oxford University Press, Oxford.*
  
- ▶ Evaluate  $C_i$  directly, without reference to  $u_i$
  
- ▶ “Capability to function”  
subject to all constraints faced by individuals
  - ▶ legal
  - ▶ economic
  - ▶ political
  - ▶ social norms
  - ▶ ...
  
- ▶ Distinction between choices and options  
(example: religious fasting vs. starving)

## Alternative to utilitarianism 2 – Opportunities approach:

- ▶ Proposed by
  - Roemer, J. E. (2009). Equality of opportunity. Harvard University Press.*
- ▶ Empirical / pragmatic approach:
  - ▶ Define a list of observable factors called “circumstances.” (parental background, race, gender, ...?)
  - ▶ Inequality predicted by these factors: “inequality of opportunity”  
Rest: “inequality of effort”
  - ▶  $v_i$ : outcomes predicted by circumstances
- ▶ Problems
  - ▶ How to pick the list of factors?
  - ▶ Separation circumstances vs. effort conceptually shaky

## 2) Intergenerational mobility and equality of opportunity

*Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Kline, P., and Saez, E. (2014). Where is the land of opportunity? The geography of intergenerational mobility in the United States. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4):1553–1623.*

*Lee, C. and Solon, G. (2009). Trends in intergenerational income mobility. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(November):766–772.*

*Black, S. and Devereux, P. (2011). Recent developments in intergenerational mobility. Handbook of Labor Economics, 4:1487–1541.*

- ▶ To what extent is equality of opportunity a reality?
- ▶ Has it changed over time? Does it differ across countries?
- ▶ Often translated as:  
To what extent does family background determine life chances, and, in particular, income?
- ▶ The question is less well defined than it might seem.
- ▶ There are several alternative objects one might try to estimate.



## Object 1

- ▶ **Predictability** of (log) child income in a given year  $s$  (or a few years) **using** (log) parent **income in a given year**  $t$  (or a few years):

$$E[Y_{c,s} | Y_{p,t}]$$

- ▶ Expressed as elasticity (regression slope):

$$\frac{\text{Cov}(Y_{p,t}, Y_{c,s})}{\text{Var}(Y_{p,t})}$$

- ▶ If  $Y = \log$  income:  
Percentage increase in an average child's income for a 1% increase in parent income
- ▶ Most common measure of intergenerational mobility

## Object 2

- ▶ **Predictability** of (log) child's lifetime income **using** (log) parent's **lifetime income**:

$$E[\bar{Y}_c | \bar{Y}_p]$$

- ▶ Expressed as elasticity (regression slope):

$$\frac{\text{Cov}(\bar{Y}_p, \bar{Y}_c)}{\text{Var}(\bar{Y}_p)}$$

- ▶ Life cycle of earnings, transitory shocks, measurement error  
⇒ Income in given year varies a lot around lifetime income.  
⇒ Lifetime income is in general more strongly related between parents and children.
- ▶ Lifetime income usually not available in data

## Object 3

- ▶ **Predictability using additional variables:**

$$E[\bar{Y}_c | \bar{Y}_p, X_p, W_p]$$

- ▶ Expressed as elasticities (regression slopes):

$$\text{Var}((\bar{Y}_p, X_p, W_p))^{-1} \cdot \text{Cov}((\bar{Y}_p, X_p, W_p), \bar{Y}_c).$$

- ▶ Motivation: Why stop at parental income?  
Other factors such as parent education, location of residence, etc., also predict a child's outcomes and are “morally arbitrary.”
- ▶ The more predictive factors we consider, the better we can predict a child's outcomes.

## Object 4

- ▶ The **causal effect of parent lifetime income**:

$$\bar{Y}_c = g(\bar{Y}_p, \varepsilon).$$

- ▶ Not all correlations are causal – do we care about prediction or causality?
- ▶ Example: Parent and child incomes might be correlated because parental education has a causal effect, but not parental income.
- ▶ Notation: If parent income is changed,  $g$  and  $\varepsilon$  do *not* change, describing counterfactual (cf. potential outcomes)

## Object 5

- ▶ The **causal effect of additional variables**:

$$\bar{Y}_c = h(\bar{Y}_p, X_p, W_p, \varepsilon')$$

- ▶ Combines 3 and 4.

## Takeaways for empirical research

- ▶ Equality of opportunity  $\neq$  high intergenerational mobility
  - ▶ Equality of opportunity supposes distinction constraints vs. choices
  - ▶ Unjustified but common: mapping into distinction predictability (by parent income) vs. residual
- ▶ Empirical research should consider comprehensive set of predictors for child life-outcomes
- ▶ Prediction vs. causation
  - ▶ Prediction relevant to the extent that predictable inequalities are considered less legitimate (unequal opportunity).
  - ▶ Causation relevant to the extent that policy interventions might affect life chances of children.

### 3) Inequality between groups and discrimination

- ▶ We observe large economic inequalities along dimensions such as race and gender.
- ▶ Why?
- ▶ Many channels through which they might be created!

## Possible channels

### Differences in

1. early childhood influences
2. neighborhoods of growing up
3. access to / quality of  
primary, middle, and high school education
4. chance of being hired when applying for a job
5. wages conditional on being hired
6. chance of being promoted or fired in a given job
7. treatment by customers or clients
8. treatment by police and courts
9. ...



## 4. Chance of being hired when applying for a job

Decomposes further into

- a. chance of being invited to an interview
- b. chance of being hired given an interview

## a. Chance of being invited to an interview

*Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2004). Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination. American Economic Review, 94(4):991–1013.*

- ▶ Chance might depend on
  1. the (perceived) race and gender of an applicant,
  2. neighborhood of residence,
  3. the high school attended, ...
- ▶ Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004):  
What is the causal effect of perceived race on the chance of being invited to an interview, for *otherwise identical* CVs?

## What is a causal effect?

- ▶ Potential outcome framework: answer to “what if” questions
- ▶ Two “treatments”:  $D = 0$  or  $D = 1$
- ▶ e.g. “black name” vs. “white name” on the CV
- ▶  $Y_i$ : CV  $i$ 's outcome  
e.g. being invited for an interview
- ▶ Potential outcome  $Y_i^0$ :  
what if CV  $i$  had a “black name” (treatment 0)
- ▶ Potential outcome  $Y_i^1$ :  
what if CV  $i$  had a “white name” (treatment 1)

## Takeaways for empirical research

- ▶ Two reasons to focus on inequality between specific groups:
  1. Associated with specific mechanisms
  2. Normative salience
- ▶ Many mechanisms generate between-group inequalities.
  - ▶ one of them: different treatment in hiring
  - ▶ possible reasons: statistical discrimination, employer / co-worker / customer bigotry,...

- ▶ Conjecture: focus on discrimination in this literature is related to a normative ideal of a competitive market.
  - ▶ Under some conditions, discrimination in this sense is absent from competitive markets.
  - ▶  $\Rightarrow$  wages and hiring just reflect “marginal productivity.”
  - ▶ Absence of discrimination is consistent with great inequalities, e.g. due to different access to education.
- ▶ Research on between-group inequality should
  - ▶ Consider variety of mechanisms, rather than focus only on discrimination in the labor market.
  - ▶ Also consider within-group inequality.

## Advertisement

- ▶ I will teach a PhD class on empirical research on economic inequality at WU starting May 22; guests welcome.
- ▶ More on concepts and methods: my open online textbook,

`http://inequalityresearch.net/`

Thank you!